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The Impact of Payoff Interdependence on Trust and Trustworthiness

  • Werner Güth
  • M. Vittoria Levati
  • Matteo Ploner

In one-shot investment games where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, we measure trust by the amount given to the trustee and trustworthiness by the amount returned to the trustor by the trustee. Does the degree of payoff interdependence increase both trust and trustworthiness or one but not the other or neither of them? According to our experimental data, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2008.00424.x
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Article provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal German Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 9 (2008)
Issue (Month): (02)
Pages: 87-95

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Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:9:y:2008:i::p:87-95
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  1. Gneezy, U. & Güth, W. & Verboven, F.L., 1998. "Presents or investments? An experimental analysis," Discussion Paper 1998-44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Werner Güth & Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "Vertical Cross-Shareholding Theory and Experimental Evidence," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-11, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  3. Bellemare, Charles & Kröger, Sabine, 2003. "On Representative Trust," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2003,27, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  4. Bellemare, C. & Kroger, S., 2004. "On Representative Social Capital," Discussion Paper 2004-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Guerra, Gerardo & John Zizzo, Daniel, 2004. "Trust responsiveness and beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 25-30, September.
  6. Harvey James, 2002. "The Trust Paradox: A Survey of Economic Inquiries Into the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness," Microeconomics 0202001, EconWPA.
  7. James Jr., Harvey S., 2002. "The trust paradox: a survey of economic inquiries into the nature of trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 291-307, March.
  8. Andreas Ortmann & John Fitzgerald & Carl Boeing, 2000. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 81-100, June.
  9. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  10. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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  12. Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner & Vittoria Levati, . "The Effect of Group Identity in an Investment Game," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  13. repec:oxf:wpaper:099 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
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