IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/germec/v7y2006ip463-470.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Demougin
  • Carsten Helm

Abstract

We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Demougin & Carsten Helm, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7, pages 463-470, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:7:y:2006:i::p:463-470
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00130.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, March.
    2. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
    3. Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 731-738, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sanxi Li & Hailin Sun & Jianye Yan & Xundong Yin, 2015. "Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 115(3), pages 257-274, July.
    2. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Helm, Carsten, 2008. "How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 263-271, December.
    4. Benjamin Bental & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Institutions, Bargaining Power and Labor Shares," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-009, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    5. Demougin, Dominique M. & Helm, Carsten, 2008. "Incentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefits," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 191, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics.
    6. Michela Cella & Federico Etro, 2016. "Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(3), pages 193-218, July.
    7. repec:zbw:hohpro:348 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Telalagic, S., 2012. "Domestic Production as a Source of Marital Power: Theory and Evidence from Malawi," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1243, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    9. Gan, Liu & Luo, Pengfei & Yang, Zhaojun, 2016. "Real option, debt maturity and equity default swaps under negotiation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 278-284.
    10. repec:old:wpaper:348 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Alexander Zimper, 2013. "Optimal Liquidity Provision Through a Demand Deposit Scheme: The Jacklin Critique Revisited," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(1), pages 89-107, February.
    12. Itza Curiel & Sonia Di Giannatale & Juan Herrera & Katya Rodríguez, 2012. "Pareto Frontier of a Dynamic Principal–Agent Model with Discrete Actions: An Evolutionary Multi-Objective Approach," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 40(4), pages 415-443, December.
    13. Demougin, Dominique & Helm, Carsten, 2011. "Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 964-979.
    14. Dittrich, Marcus & Städter, Silvio, 2015. "Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 75-85.
    15. Bental, Benjamin & Demougin, Dominique, 2010. "Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 443-456, March.
    16. Kragl, Jenny & Gogova, Martina, 2013. "Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79790, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    17. Carsten Helm & Dominique Demougin, 2012. "Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World," Working Papers V-348-12, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2012.
    18. Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2006. "Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 2367, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:7:y:2006:i::p:463-470. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.