Monopolistic Screening with Boundedly Rational Consumers
In this paper, I revisit the monopolistic screening problem with two types assuming that consumers are boundedly rational. Bounded rationality implies that the revelation principle does not apply and the choice of the selling mechanism entails a loss of generality. I show that if the monopolist restricts attention to the mechanisms that offer menus of two choices, the profits are lower than in the case of fully rational consumers by the term of order ln λ/λ, where λ is the degree of rationality of the consumers. The monopolist, however, can approximate the profits earned when consumers are fully rational by using a more elaborate message game. Copyright Â© 2009 The Economic Society of Australia.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 85 (2009)
Issue (Month): s1 (09)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 61 3 9497 4140
Fax: 61 3 9497 4140
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0249
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0013-0249|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, March.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002.
"The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
- Suren Basov & Svetlana Danilkina & David Prentice, 2008.
"When does Variety increase with Quality?,"
2008.04, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Suren Basov & Svetlana Danilkina & David Prentice, 2008. "When does Variety increase with Quality?," Working Papers 2008.04, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Basov, Suren & Danilkina, Svetlana & Prentice, David, 2009. "When does variety increase with quality?," MPRA Paper 13445, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rochet, J. C., 1985. "The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 113-128, April.
- R. McKelvey & T. Palfrey, 2010. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 510, David K. Levine.
- John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:85:y:2009:i:s1:p:s29-s34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.