The Efficiency of State Taxes on Mobile Labour Income
We model a federation where States levy a tax on the wage income of mobile citizens who shop between States for their preferred tax and public policy package. It is shown that competition between States results in efficient State spending but that the taxes on wage income are inefficient in the sense that mobile taxpayers are allocated inefficiently across States. The implication is that if States tax the wage income of mobile workers, there may be benefits from policy competition (a more competitive federal system) but also costs associated with the inefficiency. The central government can correct for the inefficiency, but this requires a complex system of inter-State transfers that are difficult to implement in practice. Copyright 2000 by The Economic Society of Australia.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 76 (2000)
Issue (Month): 234 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Central Council Administration, L.P.O. Box 2161, Hawthorn VIC 3122|
Phone: 61 3 9497 4140
Fax: 61 3 9497 4140
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0249
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0013-0249|