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International Capital Mobility And Trade Politics: Capital Flows, Political Coalitions, And Lobbying

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  • Michael J. Hiscox

Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.

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  • Michael J. Hiscox, 2004. "International Capital Mobility And Trade Politics: Capital Flows, Political Coalitions, And Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16, pages 253-285, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:253-285
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    Cited by:

    1. Zsolt Szabó, 2012. "The Impact of Capital Market Players’ Exit, Voice and Loyalty on Economic Growth," Public Finance Quarterly, State Audit Office of Hungary, vol. 57(4), pages 474-489.

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