A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers
This paper tests a model of political control of the bureaucracy using a data set of mergers evaluated by the Federal Trade Commission between 1983 and 2000. The results support a sophisticated control model in which the President sets the agenda within the scope of policies acceptable to Congress. Changes in Presidential administration and in the composition of Congress can, but do not necessarily, affect merger policy. Instead, the shift in policy depends on how the institutions of the Presidency and Congress interact both in the previous and current periods. Copyright 2002 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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Volume (Year): 14 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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