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Self--enforcing Intergenerational Transfers and the Provision of Education

  • Dan Anderberg

    (University of Stirling)

  • Alessandro Balestrino

    (University of Pisa)

This paper considers intra--family financing of human capital under the assumptions that individuals are selfish and binding contracts are not feasible. Cooperation among family members is possible through a family norm (a family "social capital") which prescribes the obligations to be met at each stage in life and sanctions for those who deviate. We characterize the set of self--enforcing transfers and show that there is a downward bias in the family provision of education. This gives a rationale for public action as a remedy to the lack of commitment between selfish family members. Copyright The London School of Economics and Political Science 2003

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Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
Issue (Month): 277 (February)
Pages: 55-71

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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:70:y:2003:i:277:p:55-71
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