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Renegotiation-Proof Labour and Credit Contracts with Worker Mobility

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  • Tsoulouhas, Theofanis

Abstract

This paper investigates the interaction between a privately informed firms contracts for labour and its contracts for credit. The analysis shows that if the worker has no ex post outside opportunities, or if the liquidation value of the firm is large, then the credit contract can always be state-independent: if the worker has outside opportunities and the liquidation value is small, then the credit contract must be state-dependent. However, if the worker is unable to precommit not to renegotiate with the firm, then the credit contract must be state-independent to ensure renegotiation-proofness and protect the interests of the creditor. This leads to credit rationing and under-investment. Copyright 1999 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

Suggested Citation

  • Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Renegotiation-Proof Labour and Credit Contracts with Worker Mobility," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(264), pages 433-454, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:66:y:1999:i:264:p:433-54
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    Cited by:

    1. Josep Tribo, 2005. "An analysis of the length of labour and financial contracts: a study for Spain," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(8), pages 905-916.
    2. Dominique Demougin & Oliver Fabel, 2006. "The Division of Ownership in New Ventures," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-047, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

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