Private Income Transfers and Market Incentives
The paper introduces labor supply considerations, and labor earnings uncertainty into a parent-child framework in the presence of 'merit goods.' The author investigates the implications of various parental bequest rules on the effort decisions of the offspring, where the parent cannot perfectly observe her child's market activities. The asymmetry in information and preferences gives rise to a moral hazard problem, and as a result the parent may not fully insure her child because the source of risk is not entirely exogenous. In this case, optimal parental transfers are shown to be state-contingent. Moreover, the child's effort is higher in the case with a merit good and parental transfers than in the case without a merit good. Copyright 1998 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Volume (Year): 65 (1998)
Issue (Month): 260 (November)
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