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An Econometric Model of Farm Tenures in Fifteenth-Century Florence

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  • Pudney, Stephen
  • Galassi, Francesco L
  • Mealli, Fabrizia

Abstract

The authors estimate a discrete-choice model of farm tenures in fifteenth-century Florence using data in the form of an unbalanced panel, with individual farms nested within landlords' total property holdings. The probabilities of wage, rental, and sharecropping tenures are estimated, allowing for landlord-specific random effects. Specification tests are used to validate the model. The authors' results emphasize the role of long-lived fixed assets (vines), vulnerable to damage by short-term over-production, as a factor favoring sharecropping (which 'taxes' overproduction). However, they find evidence against theories emphasizing high monitoring costs as an influence favoring rental contracts. Copyright 1998 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

Suggested Citation

  • Pudney, Stephen & Galassi, Francesco L & Mealli, Fabrizia, 1998. "An Econometric Model of Farm Tenures in Fifteenth-Century Florence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 535-556, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:260:p:535-56
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:ecosta:v:3:y:2017:i:c:p:112-131 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Francesco, Bartolucci & Silvia, Bacci & Claudia, Pigini, 2015. "A misspecification test for finite-mixture logistic models for clustered binary and ordered responses," MPRA Paper 64220, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
    4. Partha Deb & Furio Rosati, 2002. "Determinants of Child Labor and School Attendance: The Role of Household Unobservables," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 02/9, Hunter College Department of Economics.
    5. Fukunaga, Keita & Hueth, Brent, 2006. "Contractual Externalities and Contract Design -Evidence from Farmland Lease Contracts in U.S. Agriculture," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21368, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Partha Deb, 2001. "A discrete random effects probit model with application to the demand for preventive care," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(5), pages 371-383.
    7. Stephen Pudney, "undated". "Pay Differentials, Discrimination and Worker Grievances," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 00/5, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    8. Oriana Bandiera, 1999. "On the Structure of Tenancy contracts: Theory and Evidence fron 19th Century Rural Sicily," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    9. Oriana Bandiera, 1999. "On the Structure of Tenancy contracts: Theory and Evidence fron 19th Century Rural Sicily," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    10. Ackerberg, Daniel A. & Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 241-257, July.

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