Bequests, Filial Attention and Fertility
The purpose of this paper is to show within a simple setting how the demand for children may be affected by the type of parent-children interaction, ranging from conflict with threat to more harmonious settlement. We consider the case where parents offer bequests to their children in exchange for attention. The type of parent-child interaction is formalized by the solution concept that is used to determine the bequest-attention allocation for any given number of children. The main positive finding of the paper is that there is a bias toward large families, counteracted by the possibility of a pure preference for small families and the costs of having children. Copyright 1991 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 231 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE|
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0427
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0013-0427|