Ex Post Efficiency and Ex Post Welfare: Some Fundamental Considerations
Ross Starr (1973) demonstrates that a competitive equilibrium, while ex ante Pareto efficient, may not be ex post efficient. The authors contend that an implicit second-best issue requires that this assertion be substantively qualified. Specifically, the ex ante efficiency concept is second best, while its ex post counterpart is first best. They est ablish the equivalency of first-best ex post and ex ante concepts whe never the second-best ex ante efficiency conditions hold. The second best elements derive from the timing of information flows. Starr's theorem is shown to concern the social gains from improved information. Additional results deal with varying concepts of ex post welfare. Copyright 1988 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
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Volume (Year): 55 (1988)
Issue (Month): 217 (February)
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