University Competition, Grading Standards, And Grade Inflation
We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize total wages of graduates. Job placement and wages hinge on a ﬁrm’s productivity assessment given a student’s university, grade and productivity signal. We identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards, exploiting the fact that ﬁrms cannot distinguish between “good” and “bad” “A”s. In contrast, a social planner sets stricter standards at better universities. We show how increases in skilled jobs drive grade inﬂation, and determine when grading standards fall faster at better schools.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 51 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 18830 Brookhurst Street, Suite 304, Fountain Valley, CA 92708 USA|
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0095-2583
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0095-2583|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bagnoli, M. & Bergstrom, T., 1989.
"Log-Concave Probability And Its Applications,"
89-23, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- William Chan & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2005.
"A Signaling Theory of Grade Inflation,"
tecipa-222, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Heather Rose & Julian R. Betts, 2004. "The Effect of High School Courses on Earnings," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(2), pages 497-513, May.
- Talia Bar & Asaf Zussman, 2012. "Partisan Grading," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 30-48, January.
- Manuel Bagues & Mauro Sylos Labini & Natalia Zinovyeva, 2008. "Differential Grading Standards and University Funding: Evidence from Italy," Working Papers 2008-07, FEDEA.
- Costrell, Robert M, 1994. "A Simple Model of Educational Standards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 956-71, September.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & Miguel Urquiola, 2009.
"Anti-Lemons: School Reputation and Educational Quality,"
NBER Working Papers
15112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- MacLeod, Bentley, 2009. "Anti-Lemons: School Reputation and Educational Quality," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3rc708kd, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Coate, S. & Loury, G.C., 1992.
"Will Affirmative Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?,"
3, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn C, 1993. "Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1220-40, December.
- Betts, Julian R, 1998. "The Impact of Educational Standards on the Level and Distribution of Earnings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 266-75, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:3:p:1764-1778. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.