The Effects of Tenancy and Risk on Cropping Patterns: A Mathematical Programming Analysis
Most analyses of allocative efficiency under different forms of agricultural tenure - share tenancy, fixed cash tenancy, and owner cultivation - employ single product models of production These models show that risk sharing encourages share tenants to produce as much as or more that equally risk0averse owner -operators and cash tenants However, when risk and risk aversion are introduced into multiproduct linear programming models, relative allocative efficiency under share tenancy may decline The result depends on the relative production costs and the relative risk premiums of the different products
Volume (Year): (1982)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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