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OPEC Strategies and Oil Rent in a Climate Conscious World

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel J.A. Johansson
  • Christian Azar
  • Kristian Lindgren
  • Tobias A. Persson

Abstract

In the UNFCCC process, energy exporting countries (primarily OPEC) claim compensation for losses in expected oil rent due to CO2 mitigation measures. However, there are mechanisms that may raise rather than lower the oil rent. If a carbon price is implemented universally, the cost of using oil substitutes such as unconventional oil or synthetic diesel from coal or natural gas will increase even more than the cost of using conventional oil. Here, a dynamic model that takes into account OPECÕs dominant position in the worldÕs liquid fuel market is developed in order to analyze these mechanisms. In this model, OPEC is assumed to act as strategic leader while all other liquid fuel producers act as price-takers. We find that the net present value of OPECÕs conventional oil rent increases by about 5% due to the carbon prices needed to reach stringent CO2 emission targets. For less ambitious targets, the increase in oil rent could be even higher. An extensive sensitivity analysis is also performed, which corroborates the main result.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel J.A. Johansson & Christian Azar & Kristian Lindgren & Tobias A. Persson, 2009. "OPEC Strategies and Oil Rent in a Climate Conscious World," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 23-50.
  • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:2009v30-03-a02
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hedenus, Fredrik & Azar, Christian & Johansson, Daniel J.A., 2010. "Energy security policies in EU-25--The expected cost of oil supply disruptions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 1241-1250, March.
    2. Renaud Coulomb & Fanny Henriet, 2014. "The Grey Paradox: How Oil Owners Can Benefit From Carbon Regulation," PSE Working Papers hal-00818350, HAL.
    3. Gregory F. Nemet and Adam R. Brandt, 2012. "Willingness to Pay for a Climate Backstop: Liquid Fuel Producers and Direct CO2 Air Capture," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    4. Chakravorty, Ujjayant & Leach, Andrew & Moreaux, Michel, 2011. "Would hotelling kill the electric car?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 281-296, May.
    5. Reyer Gerlagh, 2011. "Too Much Oil," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(1), pages 79-102, March.
    6. Franco Ruzzenenti & Andreas A. Papandreou, 2015. "Effects of fossil fuel prices on the transition to a low-carbon economy," Working papers wpaper89, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    7. Mercure, Jean-François & Salas, Pablo, 2013. "On the global economic potentials and marginal costs of non-renewable resources and the price of energy commodities," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 469-483.
    8. Waisman, Henri & Rozenberg, Julie & Hourcade, Jean Charles, 2013. "Monetary compensations in climate policy through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment: The case of oil-exporting countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 951-961.
    9. Marianne Haug, 2011. "Clean energy and international oil," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 92-116, Spring.
    10. Renaud Coulomb & Fanny Henriet, 2014. "The Grey Paradox: How Oil Owners Can Benefit From Carbon Regulation," Working Papers hal-00818350, HAL.
    11. Wie, Jiegen & Wennlock, Magnus & Johansson, Daniel J.A. & Sterner, Thomas, 2011. "The Fossil Endgame: Strategic Oil Price Discrimination and Carbon Taxation," Discussion Papers dp-11-26, Resources For the Future.

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    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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