Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent work answers by the affirmative — Groseclose (1999), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), (2003). We consider a two-candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two-dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidate heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on the relative competences of candidates and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods).
Volume (Year): (2009)
Issue (Month): 93-94 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://annales.ensae.fr/Email:
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988.
"Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988.
"Voting on the Budget Deficit,"
NBER Working Papers
2759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," CEPR Discussion Papers 269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Guido Tabellini & Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," UCLA Economics Working Papers 539, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," Scholarly Articles 4553030, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Enriqueta Aragones, 1997.
"Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics,
, vol. 9(2), pages 189-210, April.
- Enriqueta Aragones, 1994. "Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies," Discussion Papers 1125, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Enriqueta Aragonés, 1994. "Negativity effect and the emergence of ideologies," Economics Working Papers 163, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1995.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R., 2000.
"Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate,"
1102, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
- Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," Economics Working Papers 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
- Sachs, Jeffrey & Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," Scholarly Articles 4553026, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990.
"Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
- Sundadam, R.K. & Banks, J., 1991. "Adverse Selection and Moral hazard in a Repeated Elections Models," RCER Working Papers 283, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Robert Gary-Bobo)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.