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Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance

  • Bertrand VILLENEUVE

ln the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, assuming differences in risk aversions may lead to unusual equilibrium configurations like multiple equilibria, equilibrium positive profits, or random contracts. We characterize the various types of equilibria and give results on the determinants of the equilibrium regime. We conclude with a few remarks on classical equilibrium concepts in insurance economics, and we suggest policy implications.

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File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076366
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Article provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): 69 ()
Pages: 119-142

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Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:69:p:06
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  1. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2000. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," Working Papers 2000-41, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  2. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Macho, Ines & Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1994. "Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 1527-1553, October.
  3. Edward C Prescott & Robert M Townsend, 2010. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2069, David K. Levine.
  4. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Randomization with Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 2507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson, 1999. "A general model of insurance under adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 331-352.
  6. Smart, Michael, 2000. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 153-69, February.
  7. Claude Fluet & Fran�ois Pannequin, 1997. "Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(2), pages 81-101, December.
  8. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26, January.
  9. Fagart, Marie-Cécile, 1993. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9317, CEPREMAP.
  10. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 27-41, January.
  11. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: a Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  12. John G. Riley, 1976. "Informational Equilibrium," UCLA Economics Working Papers 071, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2000. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," Working Papers 2000-41, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  14. Simon, Leo K. & Zame, William R., 1987. "Discontinous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8n46v2wv, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  15. Doherty, Neil A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1983. "Optimal Insurance in Incomplete Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 1045-54, December.
  16. Koehl, Pierre-Francois & Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2001. "Complementarity and Substituability in Multiple-Risk Insurance Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(1), pages 245-66, February.
  17. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1988. " Stock Market Portfolios and the Segmentation of the Insurance Market," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(3), pages 435-46.
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