Optimal Dynamic Contracting
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2014.
"Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(5), pages 1557-1614, September.
- Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2014. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 1557-1614, September.
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- Halac, Marina & Yared, Pierre, 2012. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks," Economic Research Papers 270535, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
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"Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers,"
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More about this item
Keywords
models; optimal allocation; complex environment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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