Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
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JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-1999-02-08 (Microeconomics)
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