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Incentive Contracts

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Listed:
  • Edward P. Lazear

Abstract

Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward P. Lazear, 1986. "Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 1917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1917
    Note: LS
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w1917.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marjan, MAES, 2008. "Does the dismantlement of early retirement schemes increase unemployment in Belgium ?," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2008041, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    2. Alexandros Karakostas & Axel Sonntag & Daniel John Zizzo, 2013. "Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing Contracts," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Erling Barth & Bernt Bratsberg & Torbjørn Hægeland & Oddbjørn Raaum, 2008. "Who pays for performance?," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 29(1), pages 8-29, March.
    4. Gary Burtless & Alicia H. Munnell, 1990. "Does a trend toward early retirement create problems for the economy?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Nov, pages 17-32.
    5. Harvey S. James Jr., 1997. "A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm," Law and Economics 9705001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Feb 2002.

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