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Reinterpreting social pacts: theory an evidence

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  • Emilio Colombo
  • Patrizio Tirelli
  • Jelle Visser

Abstract

Economists have largely neglected the analysis of the relevant factors that induce policymakers and trade unions to sign social pacts, despite their clear implications for economic policies and the functioning of labour markets. In this paper we fill this gap. We build a simple theoretical framework that models social pacts as the outcome of a bargaining process, where the probability of observing a pact is essentially determined by politico-economic factors. Then we test the model using a new and original data set that documents the features of social pacts implemented in advanced economies over the last 30 years.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilio Colombo & Patrizio Tirelli & Jelle Visser, 2010. "Reinterpreting social pacts: theory an evidence," Working Papers 187, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised May 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:187
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Ceron & Luigi Curini & Fedra Negri, 2019. "Intra-party politics and interest groups: missing links in explaining government effectiveness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 407-427, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social pacts; institutions macroeconomic outcomes;

    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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