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Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility

Author

Listed:
  • Ulrich Hege

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eberhard Feess

Abstract

Firms will exert too little care due to a limited liability effect if damages are likely to exceed their equity. This is particularly important for environmental and product liability and motivates the current discussion about mandatory insurance and extending liability to creditors. We model the choice of the care level as a moral hazard problem that can be solved through costly monitoring. Conventional strict liability and lender liability both lead to distortions in the capital structure and to inefficiently low care. By contrast, mandatory liability coverage (financial responsibility) that can be satisfied by either an insurance contract or a lender guarantee leads to the first best allocation if managers can self-insure, and to the second best if managers cannot self-insure but choose to be monitored.

Suggested Citation

  • Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess, 2000. "Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility," Post-Print hal-00759748, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00759748
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    Cited by:

    1. Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility"," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 323-339, September.
    2. Hutchinson, Emma & van 't Veld, Klaas, 2005. "Extended liability for environmental accidents: what you see is what you get," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 157-173, January.
    3. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2007. "Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-04, CIRANO.
    4. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2010. "Optimal liability sharing and court errors: an exploratory analysis," Working Papers hal-00463913, HAL.
    5. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2008. "The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental Disasters: Lessons For Optimal Insurance Regulation," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-03, CIRANO.
    6. Tim Friehe, 2014. "Tacit collusion and liability rules," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 453-469, December.
    7. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Generalized Progress of Abatement Technology: Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(1), pages 61-71, September.
    8. Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 2010. "Environmental risks, the judgment-proof problem and financial responsibility," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 77-87, October.
    9. Kvakkestad, Valborg & Vatn, Arild, 2011. "Governing uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified crops," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 524-532, January.
    10. van 't Veld, Klaas & Hutchinson, Emma, 2009. "Excessive spending by firms to avoid accidents: Is it a concern in practice?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 324-335, December.

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