IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-344277.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Simplifying the Measure of Concentration from Common Ownership: A Note

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Estache
  • Maxime Katté
  • Christophe Kieffer

Abstract

The note presents a simpler alternative to the Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure the risks of market concentration in the presence of common owners such as institutional investors owning shares in multiple firms expected to compete in the same market. This new measure, the Amplified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, delivers the same insights as the MHHI but is less data intensive and less sensitive to outliers. It thus offers a more “user friendly” and more precise alternative to competition and regulatory agencies as a decision trigger for more detailed investigations of market power risks associated with the growing presence of common ownership.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Estache & Maxime Katté & Christophe Kieffer, 2022. "Simplifying the Measure of Concentration from Common Ownership: A Note," Working Papers ECARES 2022-19, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/344277
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/344277/3/2022-19-ESTACHE_KATTE_KIEFFER-simplifying.pdf
    File Function: Œuvre complète ou partie de l'œuvre
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Salop, Steven C., 1986. "Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 155-175, June.
    2. Marie Goppelsroeder & Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra, 2008. "Quantifying The Scope For Efficiency Defense In Merger Control: The Werden‐Froeb‐Index," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 778-808, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2018. "Quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 108-149.
    2. Brito, Duarte & Osório, António & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2018. "Unilateral effects screens for partial horizontal acquisitions: The generalized HHI and GUPPI," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 127-189.
    3. Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2014. "Measuring unilateral effects in partial horizontal acquisitions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 22-36.
    4. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    5. Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Florian Szücs, 2013. "An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 596-619, November.
    6. van Driel, Hugo, 2000. "Collusion in transport: group effects in a historical perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 385-404, April.
    7. Werner Neus & Manfred Stadler & Maximiliane Unsorg, 2020. "Market structure, common ownership, and coordinated manager compensation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1262-1268, October.
    8. Hariskos, W. & Königstein, M. & Papadopoulos, K.G., 2022. "Anti-competitive effects of partial cross-ownership: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 399-409.
    9. Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2019. "Can partial horizontal ownership lessen competition more than a monopoly?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 90-95.
    10. Ángel L. López & Xavier Vives, 2019. "Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(5), pages 2394-2437.
    11. Fiocco, Raffaele, 2016. "The strategic value of partial vertical integration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 284-302.
    12. Emilie Dargaud, 2013. "Horizontal mergers, efficiency gains and remedies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 349-372, October.
    13. Jacob P. Gramlich & Serafin J. Grundl, 2017. "Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common Ownership," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-029, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    14. Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2020. "Overlapping ownership, endogenous quality, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    15. Gibbon, Alexandra J. & Schain, Jan Philip, 2023. "Rising markups, common ownership, and technological capacities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    16. Farrell Joseph & Shapiro Carl, 2010. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-41, March.
    17. Balmera, Roberto E. & Ünverb, Mehmet Bilal, 2016. "Cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks: A review of recent practical cases and literature," 27th European Regional ITS Conference, Cambridge (UK) 2016 148657, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    18. J.W.B. Bos & I. Chan & J. Kolari & J. Yuan, 2009. "A Fallacy of Division: The Failure of Market Concentration as a Measure of Competition in U.S. Banking," Working Papers 09-33, Utrecht School of Economics.
    19. Chen, Zhiqi & Ross, Thomas W., 2020. "Buffer joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    20. Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Common Ownership; Institutional Investors; Market Power; Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/344277. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/arulbbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.