The Proper Scope of Governments When Costs are Contractible
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Keywords
Privatization; Ownership; Incomplete contracts;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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