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Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform

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  • Morelli, Massimo
  • Ash, Elliott
  • Vannoni, Matia

Abstract

This paper sheds new light on the drivers of civil service reform in U.S. states. We first demonstrate theoretically that divided government is a key trigger of civil service reform, providing nuanced predictions for specific configurations of divided government. We then show empirical evidence for these predictions using data from the second half of the 20th century: states tended to introduce these reforms under divided government, and in particular when legislative chambers (rather than legislature and governor) were divided.

Suggested Citation

  • Morelli, Massimo & Ash, Elliott & Vannoni, Matia, 2019. "Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 13878, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13878
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael M Ting & James M Snyder Jr & Shigeo Hirano & Olle Folke, 2013. "Elections and reform: The adoption of civil service systems in the U.S. states," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 363-387, July.
    2. Gergely Ujhelyi, 2014. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 338-380, May.
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