Mediators Enable Truthful Voting
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- Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia, 2007. "Mediators Enable Truthful Voting," Discussion Paper Series dp451, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Bezalel Peleg & Ariel Procaccia, 2010.
"Implementation by mediated equilibrium,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 191-207, March.
- Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia, 2007. "Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp463, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans, 2017.
"Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 43-50.
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2015. "Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization," Discussion Paper Series dp693, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M., 2016. "Feasible elimination procedures in social choice : an axiomatic characterization," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
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