An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets
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- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2015. "An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2014, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2019.
"Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(5), pages 2301-2342.
- Yeon Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2015. "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001065, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2015. "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2013, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2019. "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets," Post-Print halshs-02087847, HAL.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Olivier Tercieux, 2019. "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02087847, HAL.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004.
"Kidney Exchange,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0308002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Roth, Alvin & Ünver, M. Utku & Sönmez, Tayfun, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," Scholarly Articles 2580565, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2015-09-26 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2015-09-26 (Network Economics)
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