Spatial Organization of Firms: The Decision to Split Production and Administration
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- Kristin Aarland & James C. Davis & J. Vernon Henderson & Yukako Ono, 2007. "Spatial organization of firms: the decision to split production and administration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 480-494, June.
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