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Voting on Income Redistribution: How a Little Bit of Altruism Creates Transitivity

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  • Wittman, Donald

Abstract

We consider an election that is solely concerned with redistribution of income. It is well known that when voters are selfish, there is no political equilibrium. We consider the case where voters are modestly altruistic. We demonstrate that modest altruism results in a unique political equilibrium. We also provide an explanation for why voters are much more altruistic than individuals acting alone.

Suggested Citation

  • Wittman, Donald, 2005. "Voting on Income Redistribution: How a Little Bit of Altruism Creates Transitivity," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6x11511s, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt6x11511s
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benjamin Ward, 1961. "Majority rule and allocation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 5(4), pages 379-389, December.
    2. Peter Coughlin, 1986. "Elections and income redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 27-91, January.
    3. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Juárez-Luna & Christian Ghiglino, 2014. "Elite capture of democratic politics: the role of social identity," Working papers DTE 573, CIDE, División de Economía.
    2. David Juárez-Luna & Christian Ghiglino, 2014. "Elite capture of democratic politics: the role of social identity," Working papers DTE 573, CIDE, División de Economía.
    3. Christian Ghiglino & David Juárez-Luna & Andreas Müller, 2021. "Class Altruism and Redistribution [Institutions, factor pricing, and taxation: virtues of strong states?]," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(640), pages 3274-3295.
    4. repec:esx:essedp:751 is not listed on IDEAS

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