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The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test

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In one of the most ambitious forms of environmental decision-making, representatives of interested parties – environmentalists, developers, farmers, loggers, miners, etc. - are charged with the responsibility of developing a set of public policies that is acceptable to all of them. Although this approach has become increasingly popular, and has been widely discussed in the academic literature, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached in this type of negotiation. We do not know, for example, whether these outcomes meet the standard criteria for efficiency or equity. In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to test whether a number of axiomatic models of bargaining can predict the behavior of the parties to environmental decision making. In recognition of the multi-dimensional aspect of most public land use conflicts, we ask pairs of subjects to negotiate over two goods, without the possibility of cash side payments. We thus provide one of the first experimental tests of a prediction associated with the Edgeworth Box: that parties with an initial endowment that is Pareto inefficient will make trades until they reach a Pareto efficient allocation. We further test whether parties in particular reach the Nash bargain when it coincides with or conflicts with outcomes that maximise the parties’ joint payoffs and with outcomes at which the parties’ receive equal payoffs. Finally, the effect of providing parties with full or partial information regarding payoffs is also examined.

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  • Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, 2008. "The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test," Working Papers in Economics 08/08, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:cbt:econwp:08/08
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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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    6. Bruce, Christopher, 2006. "Modeling the environmental collaboration process: A deductive approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 275-286, September.
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    10. Rhoads, Thomas A & Shogren, Jason F, 2003. "Regulation through Collaboration: Final Authority and Information Symmetry in Environmental Coasean Bargaining," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 63-89, July.
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    1. repec:clg:wpaper:2009-18 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, "undated". "Using Collaborative Bargaining to Develop Environmental Policy when Information is Private," Working Papers 2011-07, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 11 Mar 2011.
    3. Benoît Maux, 2018. "On the Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Increasing Direct Participation Rights in Democracies: Comment on “Proposals for a Democracy of the Future” by Bruno S. Frey," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 101-109, June.
    4. Christopher Bruce, "undated". "The Use of Collaborative Bargaining in Agricultural Policy-Making," Working Papers 2012-04, Department of Economics, University of Calgary.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Axiomatic models of bargaining; Experimental tests; Land use conflicts; Collaborative policymaking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects

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