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Civil Conflict: Ended Or Never Ending?

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  • Adam Idzik & Gyula O.H. Katona & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "Civil Conflict: Ended Or Never Ending?," Working Papers 99-33, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-33
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    File URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp99-33.pdf
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    1. Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34.
    2. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2004. "Bargaining Sets of Voting Games," Discussion Paper Series dp376, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Lloyd S. Shapley, 1967. "On balanced sets and cores," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(4), pages 453-460.
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