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Improving farmer trust and seller reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh

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  • De Brauw, Alan D.
  • Kramer, Berber

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  • De Brauw, Alan D. & Kramer, Berber, 2018. "Improving farmer trust and seller reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274139, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea18:274139
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274139
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    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    2. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2011. "The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 526-555, April.
    3. Anna, Petrenko, 2016. "Мaркування готової продукції як складова частина інформаційного забезпечення маркетингової діяльності підприємств овочепродуктового підкомплексу," Agricultural and Resource Economics: International Scientific E-Journal, Agricultural and Resource Economics: International Scientific E-Journal, vol. 2(1), March.
    4. Fairbairn, Anna & Michelson, Hope & Ellison, Brenna & Manyong, Victor, 2016. "Mineral Fertilizer Quality: Implications for Markets and Small Farmers in Tanzania," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 236818, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Steffen Huck & Gabriele K. Lünser & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2016. "Price competition and reputation in markets for experience goods: an experimental study," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 99-117, February.
    6. Michael Spence, 2002. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 434-459, June.
    7. Tanguy Bernard & Alain de Janvry & Samba Mbaye & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2017. "Expected Product Market Reforms and Technology Adoption by Senegalese Onion Producers," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1096-1115.
    8. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    9. Ashour, Maha & Billings, Lucy & Gilligan, Daniel & Hoel, Jessica B. & Karachiwalla, Naureen, 2016. "Do beliefs about agricultural inputs counterfeiting correspond with actual rates of counterfeiting? Evidence from Uganda:," IFPRI discussion papers 1552, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
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    Cited by:

    1. Kapoor, Sanjeev & Kumar, Niraj, 2021. "Reducing the buyer–seller information asymmetry in agricultural inputs markets in India," Agricultural Economics Research Review, Agricultural Economics Research Association (India), vol. 34(1), June.

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    Keywords

    Behavioral & Institutional Economics; Experimental Economics; International Development;
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