IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pla326.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Laurent Lamy

Personal Details

First Name:Laurent
Middle Name:
Last Name:Lamy
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pla326
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2007 Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED)

Paris, France
http://www.centre-cired.fr/
RePEc:edi:ciredfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Laurent LAMY & Manasa PATNAM & Michael VISSER, 2019. "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Working Papers 2019-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  2. Olivier Compte & Lamy Laurent & Laurent Emmanuel, 2017. "Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling? [Mercados y parcelación: ¿agrupación o división?]," Post-Print halshs-01509658, HAL.
  3. Lamy, Laurent & Jehiel, Philippe, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," CEPR Discussion Papers 11564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11376, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Laurent Lamy, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides (joint work with Philippe Jehiel)," Post-Print hal-01688249, HAL.
  6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.
  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2015. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 10758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01206167, HAL.
  9. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," Post-Print halshs-01206167, HAL.
  10. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00840844, HAL.
  13. Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," Post-Print halshs-00840844, HAL.
  14. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754606, HAL.
  15. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754581, HAL.
  16. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Post-Print halshs-00754581, HAL.
  17. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
  18. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Post-Print halshs-00754414, HAL.
  19. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," Post-Print halshs-00754436, HAL.
  20. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564887, HAL.
  21. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  22. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586068, HAL.
  23. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  24. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions : Evidence from Cross-Border Capacity Auctions," Working Papers 2007-27, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  25. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "On the Comparative Statics of the Optimal Reserve Price : A Comment on "Reserve price Signaling"," Working Papers 2007-23, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  26. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts," Working Papers 2007-25, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  27. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Individual Rationality Under Sequential Decentralized Participation Processes," Working Papers 2007-28, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  28. Laurent Lamy, 2005. "The 'Shill Bidding Effect' Versus the 'Linkage Principle'," Working Papers 2005-35, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

Articles

  1. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
  4. Olivier Compte & Laurent Lamy & Emmanuel Laurent, 2017. "Marchés et allotissement : regroupement ou dégroupement ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(2), pages 141-162.
  5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
  6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2595-2643, August.
  7. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
  8. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
  9. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
  10. Wayne R. Pryor & Abigail M. Rymer & Donald G. Mitchell & Thomas W. Hill & David T. Young & Joachim Saur & Geraint H. Jones & Sven Jacobsen & Stan W. H. Cowley & Barry H. Mauk & Andrew J. Coates & Jacq, 2011. "The auroral footprint of Enceladus on Saturn," Nature, Nature, vol. 472(7343), pages 331-333, April.
  11. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 503-510, July.
  12. Lamy, Laurent, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2498-2504, November.
  13. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.
  14. Philippe Zarka & Laurent Lamy & Baptiste Cecconi & Renée Prangé & Helmut O. Rucker, 2007. "Modulation of Saturn’s radio clock by solar wind speed," Nature, Nature, vol. 450(7167), pages 265-267, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Lamy, Laurent & Jehiel, Philippe, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," CEPR Discussion Papers 11564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020. "Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides," Discussion Papers 2020-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    2. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    3. Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023. "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Post-Print hal-03924664, HAL.
    4. Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021. "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

  2. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11376, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    2. Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023. "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Post-Print hal-03924664, HAL.
    3. Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Post-Print hal-04382099, HAL.

  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022. "Reserve Prices as Signals," CESifo Working Paper Series 9581, CESifo.
    2. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to market versus taking to market," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03263648, HAL.
    3. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," PSE Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    4. Julie Le Gallo & Karine Brisset & Francois Cochard, 2015. "Secret versus public reserve price in an “outcry” English procurement auction: Experimental results," Post-Print hal-03282276, HAL.
    5. Audrey Hu & Steven A Matthews & Liang Zou, 2019. "Low Reserve Prices in Auctions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(622), pages 2563-2580.
    6. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2017. "When should bidders learn reserve prices?," ERC Working Papers 1712, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    7. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3256-3298, October.
    8. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers 2008.01618, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
    9. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Pasha Andreyanov & El Hadi Caoui, 2022. "Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), pages 1203-1256, July.
    11. Marleen Marra, 2019. "Pricing and Fees in Auction Platforms with Two-Sided Entry," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2020-02, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
    12. Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2022. "Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    13. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    14. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.
    15. Lovo, Stefano & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2017. "No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 142-144.
    16. Eda Gülşen & Erdal Özmen, 2017. "Monetary Policy Trilemma, Inflation Targeting And Global Financial Crisis," ERC Working Papers 1714, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Nov 2017.

  4. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2015. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 10758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Kennes, John & le Maire, Daniel & Roelsgaard, Sebastian T., 2020. "Equivalence of canonical matching models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 169-182.
    2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557585, HAL.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    4. Baranov, Oleg, 2018. "An efficient ascending auction for private valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 495-517.
    5. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2023. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(5), pages 2517-2554.
    6. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1248, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Revelli, Federico, 2015. "The electoral migration cycle," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201548, University of Turin.
    8. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1126, Barcelona School of Economics.
    10. Felix Bierbrauer, 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit? Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und die Theorie der optimalen Besteuerung," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

  5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01206167, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557585, HAL.
    2. Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020. "Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides," Discussion Papers 2020-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021. "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 155-178.
    4. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to market versus taking to market," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03263648, HAL.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    6. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2019. "Poisson voting games: proportional rule," Working Papers 11/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    7. Olga Chiappinelli & Gyula Seres, 2021. "Optimal Discounts in Green Public Procurement," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1983, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2017. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," CEIS Research Paper 404, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 05 May 2017.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018. "Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2147R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2019.
    11. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    12. Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo.
    13. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2022. "Poisson voting games under proportional rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 507-526, April.
    14. Seung Han Yoo, 2020. "Optimal Influence Sale," Discussion Paper Series 2002, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    15. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B. & Kaplan, Todd, 2017. "Protection in government procurement auctions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 134-142.
    16. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Marechal, 2023. "Achats publics responsables et achat local : enseignements des données ouvertes françaises," Post-Print hal-03842464, HAL.
    17. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
    18. Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021. "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    19. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

  6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," Post-Print halshs-01206167, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557585, HAL.
    2. Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020. "Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides," Discussion Papers 2020-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021. "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 155-178.
    4. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to market versus taking to market," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03263648, HAL.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    6. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2019. "Poisson voting games: proportional rule," Working Papers 11/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    7. Olga Chiappinelli & Gyula Seres, 2021. "Optimal Discounts in Green Public Procurement," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1983, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2017. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," CEIS Research Paper 404, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 05 May 2017.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018. "Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2147R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2019.
    11. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    12. Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo.
    13. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2022. "Poisson voting games under proportional rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 507-526, April.
    14. Seung Han Yoo, 2020. "Optimal Influence Sale," Discussion Paper Series 2002, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    15. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B. & Kaplan, Todd, 2017. "Protection in government procurement auctions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 134-142.
    16. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Marechal, 2023. "Achats publics responsables et achat local : enseignements des données ouvertes françaises," Post-Print hal-03842464, HAL.
    17. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
    18. Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021. "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    19. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022. "Reserve Prices as Signals," CESifo Working Paper Series 9581, CESifo.
    2. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to market versus taking to market," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03263648, HAL.
    3. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," PSE Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    4. Julie Le Gallo & Karine Brisset & Francois Cochard, 2015. "Secret versus public reserve price in an “outcry” English procurement auction: Experimental results," Post-Print hal-03282276, HAL.
    5. Audrey Hu & Steven A Matthews & Liang Zou, 2019. "Low Reserve Prices in Auctions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(622), pages 2563-2580.
    6. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2017. "When should bidders learn reserve prices?," ERC Working Papers 1712, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    7. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3256-3298, October.
    8. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers 2008.01618, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
    9. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Pasha Andreyanov & El Hadi Caoui, 2022. "Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), pages 1203-1256, July.
    11. Marleen Marra, 2019. "Pricing and Fees in Auction Platforms with Two-Sided Entry," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2020-02, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
    12. Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2022. "Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    13. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    14. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.
    15. Lovo, Stefano & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2017. "No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 142-144.
    16. Eda Gülşen & Erdal Özmen, 2017. "Monetary Policy Trilemma, Inflation Targeting And Global Financial Crisis," ERC Working Papers 1714, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Nov 2017.

  8. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557585, HAL.
    2. Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games," Working Papers 25/2015, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.

  9. Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00840844, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557585, HAL.
    2. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    4. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.
    7. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
    8. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754606, HAL.

  10. Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," Post-Print halshs-00840844, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557585, HAL.
    2. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    4. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.
    7. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
    8. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754606, HAL.

  11. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754606, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Jihui Chen & Maochao Xu, 2015. "Asymmetry and revenue in second-price auctions: a majorization approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(3), pages 625-640, July.
    3. Luo, Yao, 2020. "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 354-374.
    4. Daniel Prudencio, 2023. "Productivity in Procurement Auctions of Pavement Contracts in Mexico," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 63-85, August.
    5. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    6. Jayeeta Bhattacharya & Nathalie Gimenes & Emmanuel Guerre, 2019. "Semiparametric Quantile Models for Ascending Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," Papers 1911.13063, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    7. Emmanuel Guerre & Yao Luo, 2019. "Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auction with Unobserved Competition: A Density Discontinuity Framework," Papers 1908.05476, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    8. Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard, 2015. "Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders," Working Papers 1502, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    9. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754606, HAL.

  12. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754581, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions," KIER Working Papers 926, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Baranov, Oleg, 2018. "An efficient ascending auction for private valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 495-517.
    3. Ryuji Sano, 2018. "An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 101-122, December.

  13. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Post-Print halshs-00754581, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions," KIER Working Papers 926, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Baranov, Oleg, 2018. "An efficient ascending auction for private valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 495-517.
    3. Ryuji Sano, 2018. "An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 101-122, December.

  14. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557585, HAL.
    2. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to market versus taking to market," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03263648, HAL.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.

  15. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Post-Print halshs-00754414, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Niedermayer, Andreas & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pia, 2015. "Foreclosure Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 522, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

  16. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," Post-Print halshs-00754436, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Vohra, Rakesh V., 2015. "Combinatorial Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Robert W. Day & Peter Cramton, 2012. "Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(3), pages 588-603, June.
    3. Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektas, "undated". "Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E23, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    4. Muto, Nozomu & Yasuhiro, Shirata, 2013. "Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions," Discussion Papers 2013-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
    6. Sano, Ryuji, 2013. "Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 112-117.
    7. Ott, Marion & Beck, Marissa, 2013. "Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79946, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
    9. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.
    10. Firanchuk, Alexander (Фиранчук, Александр), 2017. "Illegal Re-Export and Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Russian Food Embargo in 2014 [Незаконный Реэкспорт И Анализ Эффективности Российского Продовольственного Эмбарго 2014 Года]," Working Papers 041705, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

  17. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564887, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    2. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.

  18. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754581, HAL.
    2. Lavi, Ron & Oren, Sigal, 2012. "Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 439-456.
    3. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754581, HAL.

  19. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Jihui Chen & Maochao Xu, 2015. "Asymmetry and revenue in second-price auctions: a majorization approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(3), pages 625-640, July.
    3. Luo, Yao, 2020. "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 354-374.
    4. Daniel Prudencio, 2023. "Productivity in Procurement Auctions of Pavement Contracts in Mexico," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 63-85, August.
    5. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    6. Jayeeta Bhattacharya & Nathalie Gimenes & Emmanuel Guerre, 2019. "Semiparametric Quantile Models for Ascending Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," Papers 1911.13063, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    7. Emmanuel Guerre & Yao Luo, 2019. "Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auction with Unobserved Competition: A Density Discontinuity Framework," Papers 1908.05476, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    8. Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard, 2015. "Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders," Working Papers 1502, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    9. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754606, HAL.

  20. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts," Working Papers 2007-25, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Rieck, Thomas, 2009. "Ascending combinatorial scoring auctions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2009, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    2. Sano, Ryuji, 2011. "Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 602-606, June.
    3. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities : Vickrey Versus the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction," Working Papers 2007-26, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    4. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities: Vickrey vs. the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction," 2007 Meeting Papers 427, Society for Economic Dynamics.

  21. Laurent Lamy, 2005. "The 'Shill Bidding Effect' Versus the 'Linkage Principle'," Working Papers 2005-35, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00840844, HAL.
    3. Subir Bose & Arup Daripa, 2014. "Shills and Shipes," Discussion Papers in Economics 14/12, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    4. McCannon, Bryan C. & Minuci, Eduardo, 2020. "Shill bidding and trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C).
    5. Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
    6. Andrew Komo & Scott Duke Kominers & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Shill-Proof Auctions," Papers 2404.00475, arXiv.org.
    7. Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2017. "The Economics of Vendor Bids," ERC Working Papers 1711, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    8. Nikitkov, Alexey & Bay, Darlene, 2015. "Shill bidding: Empirical evidence of its effectiveness and likelihood of detection in online auction systems," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 42-54.
    9. Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim & Wu, Tingting, 2022. "Shill bidding and information in eBay auctions: A Laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 341-360.
    10. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    12. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01155875, HAL.
    13. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
    14. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
    15. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754606, HAL.

Articles

  1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2595-2643, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 503-510, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Lamy, Laurent, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2498-2504, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 12 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (7) 2014-06-02 2015-08-25 2016-10-23 2017-07-23 2017-07-23 2018-08-13 2018-08-13. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (5) 2017-07-23 2017-07-23 2018-08-13 2018-08-13 2019-09-30. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2011-02-19 2015-08-25 2019-09-30 2023-03-06
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2011-02-19 2017-07-23 2018-08-13 2018-08-13
  5. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2014-06-02 2017-07-23 2018-08-13
  6. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (3) 2015-08-25 2017-07-23 2018-08-13
  7. NEP-CIS: Confederation of Independent States (2) 2011-02-19 2011-02-19
  8. NEP-ECM: Econometrics (2) 2016-07-23 2019-09-30

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Laurent Lamy should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.