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Domestic lobbying and foreign direct investment. The role of policy instruments

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  • M. Ozgur Kayalica
  • Sajal Lahiri

Abstract

Following the Common Agency approach to political equilibrium, we examine how domestic interest groups can influence national policies toward FDI and how the choice of instrument by the government can affect lobbying activities. Domestic firms lobby for lower subsidies when a discriminatory subsidy on FDI is applied. However, when a subsidy is applied uniformly to both groups, they may lobby for higher subsidies. The nature of lobbying is also different for proportional and lump-sum profit subsidies when uniformly applied. The qualitative effect of the number of domestic firms or the degree of corruption on the equilibrium depends on the choice of instruments. Finally, with the help of numerical simulation, we examine whether there is any potential conflict between the government and the lobby groups on the choice of the instrument.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Ozgur Kayalica & Sajal Lahiri, 2007. "Domestic lobbying and foreign direct investment. The role of policy instruments," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 299-323.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:16:y:2007:i:3:p:299-323
    DOI: 10.1080/09638190701524316
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Etro, 2014. "Optimal Trade Policy under Endogenous Foreign Entry," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 90(290), pages 282-300, September.
    2. Keisaku Higashida & Hiroaki Ino, 2019. "Strategic Production Subsidy/Tax under Mutual Endogenous Entry of Foreign Firms," Discussion Paper Series 201, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    3. Hiroaki Ino & Akira Miyaoka, 2016. "Government-induced Production Commitment in the Open Economy," Discussion Paper Series 142, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2016.
    4. Kayalica, Ozgur M. & Espinosa-Ramirez, Rafael S., 2009. "Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 63-69, January.
    5. Liu Yao & Mukherjee Arijit, 2024. "Lobbying for Tariff Protection, International Technology Licensing and Consumer Surplus," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 24(1), pages 117-139, January.
    6. Yasukazu Ichino, 2013. "Antidumping Petition, Foreign Direct Investment, and Strategic Exports," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(1), pages 22-34, March.
    7. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2014. "Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 489-505, October.
    8. M. Ozgur Kayalica & Rafael Salvador Espinosa Ramirez, 2012. "Political contributions, subsidy and mergers," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 9(2), pages 61-80, Julio-Dic.

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