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How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox

Author

Listed:
  • Marco A. Haan
  • Peter Kooreman

Abstract

We show that due to free riding of potential voters facing positive voting costs, the proposal with the highest number of supporters can still be the most likely to lose a binary election. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman, 2003. "How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 509-522, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:3:p:509-522
    DOI: 10.1007/s003550200196
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Henning, Christian H. C. A. & Diaz, Daniel & Petri, Svetlana, 2020. "Voting vs. non-voting in Senegal: A nested multinomial logit model approach," Working Papers of Agricultural Policy WP2020-12, University of Kiel, Department of Agricultural Economics, Chair of Agricultural Policy.
    2. Toolsema, Linda A., 2003. "Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat," CCSO Working Papers 200304, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
    3. Pim Heijnen, 2009. "On the probability of breakdown in participation games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 493-511, March.
    4. Toolsema, Linda A., 2007. "Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 670-685, April.
    5. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, February.
    6. Eliaz, Kfir & Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny, 2007. "Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 236-273, January.
    7. repec:dgr:rugsom:03f16 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2004. "The curse of wealth and power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 119-123, July.
    9. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2005. "Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-5.
    10. Toolsema, Linda A., 2003. "Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat," Research Report 03F16, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    11. Henning, Christian H. C. A. & Diaz, Daniel & Lendewig, Andrea & Petri, Svetlana, 2020. "How important are abstainers in presidential elections? A comparative analysis between Africa and Latin America," Working Papers of Agricultural Policy WP2020-13, University of Kiel, Department of Agricultural Economics, Chair of Agricultural Policy.
    12. Sanne Zwart, 2010. "Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 643-677, April.
    13. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:43:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Sanne Zwart, 2007. "Fixing the Quorum: Representation versus Abstention," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/07, European University Institute.
    15. repec:dgr:rugccs:200304 is not listed on IDEAS

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