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The relationship between the normalized gradient addition mechanism and quadratic voting

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Benjamin

    (University of Southern California
    National Bureau of Economic Research)

  • Ori Heffetz

    (Cornell University
    Hebrew University of Jerusalem
    National Bureau of Economic Research)

  • Miles Kimball

    (University of Colorado
    University of Michigan
    University of Southern California
    National Bureau of Economic Research)

  • Derek Lougee

    (Cornell University)

Abstract

Quadratic voting and the normalized gradient addition mechanism are both social choice mechanisms that confront individuals with quadratic budget constraints, but they are applicable in different contexts. Adapting one or both to apply to the same context, this paper explores the relationship between these two mechanisms in three contexts: marginal adjustments of continuous policies, simultaneous voting on many public choices, and voting on a single public choice accompanied by private monetary consequences. In the process, we provide some formal analysis of quadratic voting when (instead of money) votes are paid for with abstract tokens that are equally distributed by the mechanism designer.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Benjamin & Ori Heffetz & Miles Kimball & Derek Lougee, 2017. "The relationship between the normalized gradient addition mechanism and quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 233-263, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0414-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0414-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Normalized gradient addition mechanism; Quadratic voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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