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How Applicable is the Dominant Firm Model of Price Leadership?

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  • Stephen J. Rassenti
  • Bart J. Wilson

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the usefulness of the dominant firm model of price leadership to serve as a benchmark for organizing behavior in laboratory markets. This well established model, whose origins can be traced back over a hundred years, has been recently applied to such landmark antitrust cases as Standard Oil and Alcoa and more recently to the analysis of deregulated markets for electric power. Our results indicate that in posted offer markets the dominant firm quite often produces more than the model's benchmark and sometimes at much greater prices. With sealed offer auction rules and a low elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces the theoretical output at a price greater than the prediction. However, with a high elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces more output over a wide range of prices that includes the predicted price.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen J. Rassenti & Bart J. Wilson, 2004. "How Applicable is the Dominant Firm Model of Price Leadership?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(3), pages 271-288, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:3:p:271-288
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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Saavedra & Javier Tapia, 2019. "El control de los precios excesivos en el derecho de la libre competencia: análisis y propuesta," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(153), pages 95-140.
    2. Attila Tasnádi, 2010. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 251-266, April.
    3. Shakun Datta Mago & Emmanuel Dechenaux, 2009. "Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(3), pages 289-317, September.
    4. Manel Antelo & Lluís Bru, 2024. "Intrapersonal price discrimination and welfare in a dominant firm model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 141(2), pages 163-188, March.
    5. Ahmad Reza Saboori Memar, 2013. "Profitable Entry into an Unprofitable Market," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201306, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    6. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2021. "Intrapersonal price discrimination in a dominant firm model," MPRA Paper 108412, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Dean V. Williamson & Céline Jullien & Lynne Kiesling & Carine Staropoli, 2006. "Investment Incentives and Market Power: An Experimental Analysis," EAG Discussions Papers 200605, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    8. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2021. "Horizontal contracts in a dominant firm-competitive fringe model," MPRA Paper 105774, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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