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Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

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  • Jordi Brandts
  • Gary Charness

Abstract

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(3), pages 227-238, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:227-238
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1009962612354
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiments; cooperation; strategy method;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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