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Understanding Douglass North in game-theoretic language

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  • Aoki, Masahiko

Abstract

By using game-theoretic language, this paper attempts to interpret the North's recent framework for institutional studies. Particularly relying on a foundational study of knowledge and culture in epistemic game theory, it clarifies three subtly different meanings of the beliefs used by North - behavioral, cultural, and elites' subjective - in the evolutions of institutions. It also suggests the ways to respond to the North's call for interdisciplinary approach by applying analytical tools of strategic complementarities and linked games.

Suggested Citation

  • Aoki, Masahiko, 2010. "Understanding Douglass North in game-theoretic language," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 139-146, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:streco:v:21:y:2010:i:2:p:139-146
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    Cited by:

    1. Dávila-Fernández, Marwil J. & Sordi, Serena, 2020. "Structural change in a growing open economy: Attitudes and institutions in Latin America and Asia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 358-385.
    2. Marwil J. Dávila-Fernández & Serena Sordi, 2019. "From open economies to attitudes towards change. Growth and institutions in Latin America and Asia," Department of Economics University of Siena 809, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    3. Ambrosino, Angela & Fiori, Stefano, 2017. "How Can Formal Norms Change Informal Norms? Douglass North’s Approach to Ideologies and Institutional Change," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201707, University of Turin.
    4. Ulan Kasymov & Dimitrios Zikos, 2017. "Understanding Human Actions and Institutional Change: What Are the Impacts of Power Asymmetries on Efficiency in Pasture Use?," Resources, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-19, December.
    5. Duane Windsor, 2010. "The Role of Dynamics in Stakeholder Thinking," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 79-87, August.

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