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The external costs of voting rules: a note on Guttman, Buchanan, and Tullock

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  • Arrow, Kenneth J.

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  • Arrow, Kenneth J., 1998. "The external costs of voting rules: a note on Guttman, Buchanan, and Tullock," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 219-222, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:219-222
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    1. Guttman, Joel M., 1998. "Unanimity and majority rule: the calculus of consent reconsidered," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 189-207, May.
    2. Tullock, Gordon, 1998. "Reply to Guttman," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 215-218, May.
    3. Buchanan, James M., 1998. "Agreement and efficiency: response to Guttman," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 209-213, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paulo Pereira, 2000. "From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-86, March.

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