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Price controls and electoral cycles

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  • Agenor, Pierre-Richard
  • Asilis, Carlos M.

Abstract

This paper studies the interactions between electoral considerations and the imposition of price controls by opportunistic policymakers. The analysis shows that a policy cycle emerges in which price controls are imposed in periods leading to the election, and removed immediately afterwards. The shape of the cycle is shown to depend on the periodicity of elections, the relative weight attached by the public to inflation as opposed to the macroeconomic distortions associated with price controls, the nature of wage contracts, and the degree of uncertainty about the term in office.
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  • Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Asilis, Carlos M., 1997. "Price controls and electoral cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 131-142, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:131-142
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    5. Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Asilis, Carlos M., 1997. "Price controls and electoral cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 131-142, February.
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    1. Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Asilis, Carlos M., 1997. "Price controls and electoral cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 131-142, February.
    2. Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo & Francisco González-Gómez & Marta Suárez-Varela, 2020. "Electoral opportunism and water pricing with incomplete transfer of control rights," Local Government Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(6), pages 1015-1038, November.
    3. Fatih Ozatay, 2007. "Public sector price controls and electoral cycles," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(4), pages 527-539.
    4. Srinivasan, Sunderasan, 2014. "Economic populism, partial deregulation of transport fuels and electoral outcomes in India," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 465-475.

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