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Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs

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  • Arvan, Lanny
  • Cabral, Luis
  • Santos, Vasco

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  • Arvan, Lanny & Cabral, Luis & Santos, Vasco, 1999. "Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 97-106, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:97-106
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap talk can matter in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 221-237, June.
    2. Seidmann, Daniel J., 1992. "Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 422-425, July.
    3. Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August.
    4. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
    5. A. Matsui, 2010. "Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society," Levine's Working Paper Archive 536, David K. Levine.
    6. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
    7. Watson, Joel, 1991. "Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 267-271, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
    2. Fay, Scott, 2008. "Selling an opaque product through an intermediary: The case of disguising one's product," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 59-75.
    3. Duffy, John & Feltovich, Nick, 2002. "Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-27, April.
    4. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.

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