Coalition structure values in differential information economies: is unity a strength?
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Cited by:
- Yoo, Seung Han, 2013. "An alternative proof for the existence of Radner equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 87-90.
- Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2012.
"The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 214-224.
- Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "The Harsanyi paradox and the 'right to talk' in bargaining among coalitions," Game Theory and Information 0501005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Centrone, F. & Meo, C., 2008. "Coalition formation in games without side payments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 314-320, November.
- Gustavo Bergantiños & Balbina Casas- Méndez & Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure," Game Theory and Information 0511006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- María Gómez-Rúa & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2014. "Bargaining and membership," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(2), pages 800-814, July.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:49:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Maria Gabriella Graziano & Claudia Meo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2020. "Shapley and Scarf housing markets with consumption externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1481-1514, September.
- Bergantinos, G. & Casas-Mendez, B. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. & Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007. "A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 35-58, July.
- Francesca Centrone & Claudia Meo, 2008. "Value allocations in economies with coalition structure," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(49), pages 1-8.
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