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The Pricing of Critical Applications in the Internet

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  • Cremer, Jacques
  • Hariton, Cyril

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  • Cremer, Jacques & Hariton, Cyril, 1999. "The Pricing of Critical Applications in the Internet," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 281-310, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:13:y:1999:i:4:p:281-310
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oecd, 1997. "Internet Domain Names: Allocation Policies," OECD Digital Economy Papers 30, OECD Publishing.
    2. Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1999. "Information and time-of-usage decisions in the bottleneck model with stochastic capacity and demand," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 525-548, March.
    3. Gupta, Alok & Stahl, Dale O. & Whinston, Andrew B., 1997. "A stochastic equilibrium model of internet pricing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(4-5), pages 697-722, May.
    4. Oecd, 1998. "Internet Voice Telephony Developments," OECD Digital Economy Papers 35, OECD Publishing.
    5. Cremer Jacques, 1994. "The Value of Large Extensive Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 309-317, November.
    6. Oecd, 1998. "Internet Traffic Exchange: Developments and Policy," OECD Digital Economy Papers 34, OECD Publishing.
    7. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-445, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Seungjin Han, 2003. "An Efficient Mechanism for Differentiated Quality of Internet Service," Department of Economics Working Papers 2003-05, McMaster University.
    2. William H. Sandholm, 2005. "Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 885-915.
    3. Mason, Robin, 2000. "Simple competitive Internet pricing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1045-1056, May.
    4. Ioanna D. Constantiou & Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos, 2002. "Towards Sustainable Quality Of Service In Interconnection," Game Theory and Information 0207004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Sep 2002.
    5. Crémer, Jacques & Hariton, Cyril, 2003. "Rental of a Durable Good," IDEI Working Papers 162, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    6. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2009. "Contributory infringement rule and patents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 296-310, May.
    7. Christelle Viauroux, 2007. "Optimal pricing of endogenous congestion: a disaggregated approach," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 09-107, UMBC Department of Economics, revised 17 Jul 2009.
    8. William H. Sandholm, 2002. "Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 667-689.

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