Coordination and Externalities
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Stole, Lars A., 1994. "Information expropriation and moral hazard in optimal second-source auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 463-484, July.
- Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982.
"Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
- David P. Baron & Roger B. Myerson, 1979. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Discussion Papers 412, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington David E M, 1993. "Choosing Workers' Qualifications: No Experience Necessary?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 479-502, August.
- Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "Participation constraints in the vickrey auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 31-36.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Optimal Auction Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Peter Klibanoff & Jonathan Morduch, 1995. "Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 223-247.
- Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
- Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
- Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-1257, November.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Isabelle Brocas, 2013. "Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 359-387, September.
- Brocas, Isabelle, 2013. "Selling an asset to a competitor," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 39-62.
- Aurélie Slechten, 2020.
"Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 455-481.
- Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Brocas, Isabelle, 2014. "Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 22-33.
- Isabelle Brocas, 2003. "Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 125-149, March.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018.
"Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper 90800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2020.
"A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 47-74, March.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2020. "A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability," Post-Print halshs-02138605, HAL.
- Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 2007.
"Optimal bunching without optimal control,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 405-420, May.
- Noldeke,G. & Samuelson,L., 2005. "Optimal bunching without optimal control," Working papers 13, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Optimal Bunching without Optimal Control," Working papers 2006/12, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Georg Noldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Optimal Bunching without Optimal Control," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000502, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2017. "Contractual design in agency problems with non-monotonic cost and correlated information," SERIES 02-2017, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Mar 2017.
- Ollier, Sandrine & Thomas, Lionel, 2013. "Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2383-2403.
- Péter Eso & Balázs Szentes, 2004.
"The Price of Advice,"
Discussion Papers
1416, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Balazs Szentes & Peter Eso, 2004. "The Price of Advice," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 560, Econometric Society.
- Isabelle Brocas, 2005. "Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 317-346, May.
- Péter Eső & Balázs Szentes, 2007. "The price of advice," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 863-880, December.
- Brocas, Isabelle, 2014. "Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 22-33.
- Osmundsen, P. & Hagen, K. P. & Schjelderup, G., 1998. "Internationally mobile firms and tax policy1," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 97-113, June.
- Jullien, Bruno, 2000.
"Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
- Jullien, Bruno, 1997. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," IDEI Working Papers 67, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Noldeke,G. & Samuelson,L., 2004.
"Decomposable principal-agent problems,"
Working papers
14, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Georg Noldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Decomposable Principal-Agent Problems," Microeconomics 0410004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fleckinger, Pierre, 2007.
"Informed principal and countervailing incentives,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 240-244, February.
- Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives," Post-Print hal-00607075, HAL.
- Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00607075, HAL.
- David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018.
"Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 311-347, June.
- David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2017. "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers halshs-01431170, HAL.
- David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2017. "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," PSE Working Papers halshs-01431170, HAL.
- David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information," Post-Print halshs-01631594, HAL.
- David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01631594, HAL.
- Pouyet, Jérôme & Martimort, David & Ricci, Francesco, 2017. "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11769, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lockwood, Ben, 2000.
"Production Externalities and Two-way Distortion in Principal-multi-agent Problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 142-166, May.
- Lockwood, B., 1999. "Production Externalities and Two-Way Distortion in Principal-Multi-Agent Problems," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 527, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Lockwood, Ben, 1999. "Production Externalities and Two-Way Distortion in Principal-Multi-Agent Problems," Economic Research Papers 269249, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Alasseur, Clémence & Chaton, Corinne & Hubert, Emma, 2022.
"Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance,"
Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
- Corinne Chaton & Clémence Alasseur & Emma Hubert, 2022. "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance," Post-Print halshs-03983355, HAL.
- Brighi, Luigi & D'Amato, Marcello, 2002. "Two-dimensional screening: a case of monopoly regulation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 251-264, September.
- Panico, Claudio, 2012. "Control and contract design in research collaborations: A complete contract perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 459-470.
- Danau, Daniel & Vinella, Annalisa, 2010. "Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:78:y:1998:i:1:p:103-129. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.