IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v195y2022icp272-287.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Testing an application of the political insurance model: The case of the Mexican state-level administrative courts

Author

Listed:
  • Bertoli, Paola
  • Garcia, Adriana G.
  • Garoupa, Nuno

Abstract

The insurance model posits that legislators from a specific political party create courts when they foresee a decrease in their political influence. We develop an application to administrative courts. While the traditional insurance version of the model is about present safeguards against future losses from losing political power, the application is about present safeguards against future losses caused by a potentially disloyal bureaucracy. We test the insurance model with the case of Mexico. Mexican states created 32 administrative courts in the period 1974 to 2017. Two characteristics make Mexico an unusual case. First, states created each of these courts in different time periods. Second, states exhibit significant variance in political cycles. Our empirical findings are largely consistent with the application (dealing with disloyal bureaucracy), but not with the more traditional version (preventing losses from changes in power).

Suggested Citation

  • Bertoli, Paola & Garcia, Adriana G. & Garoupa, Nuno, 2022. "Testing an application of the political insurance model: The case of the Mexican state-level administrative courts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 272-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:195:y:2022:i:c:p:272-287
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268122000270
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.021?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pellegrina, Lucia Dalla & Garoupa, Nuno & Gómez-Pomar, Fernando, 2017. "Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The case of administrative review," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 16-28.
    2. Mehmood, Sultan & Seror, Avner, 2023. "Religious leaders and rule of law," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    3. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September.
    4. McNollgast, 1999. "The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 180-217, April.
    5. Bertomeu Juan González & Pellegrina Lucia Dalla & Garoupa Nuno, 2017. "Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-35, March.
    6. Messick, Richard E, 1999. "Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 14(1), pages 117-136, February.
    7. Nuno Garoupa & Marian Gili & Fernando Gómez‐Pomar, 2012. "Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(4), pages 795-826, December.
    8. Mehmood, Sultan & Seror, Avner, 2023. "Religious leaders and rule of law," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jerg Gutmann & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Stefan Voigt, 2023. "Leader Characteristics and Constitutional Compliance," Working Papers 2023-11, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    2. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2023. "Judicial independence: Why does de facto diverge from de jure?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Spruk, Rok & Kovac, Mitja, 2019. "Replicating and extending Martin-Quinn scores," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Pontus Mattsson & Jonas Månsson & Christian Andersson & Fredrik Bonander, 2018. "A bootstrapped Malmquist index applied to Swedish district courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 109-139, August.
    5. Frank B. Cross & Dain C. Donelson, 2010. "Creating Quality Courts," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(3), pages 490-510, September.
    6. Nuno Garoupa & Laura Salamero-Teixidó & Adrián Segura, 2022. "Disagreeing in private or dissenting in public: an empirical exploration of possible motivations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 147-173, April.
    7. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Nuno Garoupa & Marian Gili, 2020. "Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Bi‐Dimensional Courts: Evidence from Catalonia," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 383-415, June.
    8. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro & Calogero Guccio, 2014. "Searching for the source of technical inefficiency in Italian judicial districts: an empirical investigation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 369-391, December.
    9. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez Pomar & Adrián Segura & Sheila Canudas, 2023. "Punishing terrorists in the Spanish Supreme Court: has ideology played any role?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-21, August.
    10. Panicos Demetriades & David Fielding, 2012. "Information, Institutions, And Banking Sector Development In West Africa," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(3), pages 739-753, July.
    11. Jerg Gutmann & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Stefan Voigt, 2024. "The comparative constitutional compliance database," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 95-115, January.
    12. Joseph Keneck Massil, 2015. "Economie constitutionnelle en Afrique: analyse empirique du changement de l’article sur la limitation de mandat des présidents," Working Papers hal-04141384, HAL.
    13. Hasan LUBNA, 2011. "Rule Of Law Legal Development And Economic Growth Perspectives For Pakistan," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 2(1), pages 48-59.
    14. Reinhold Kosfeld & Christian Dreger & Hans-Friedrich Eckey, 2008. "On the stability of the German Beveridge curve: a spatial econometric perspective," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 42(4), pages 967-986, December.
    15. Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Are International Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(1), pages 1-20, March.
    16. Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2020. "Judicial independence in the EU: a puzzle," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 83-100, February.
    17. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-141, March.
    18. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    19. George Tridimas, 2010. "Constitutional judicial review and political insurance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 81-101, February.
    20. Berger, Helge & Neugart, Michael, 2011. "Labor courts, nomination bias, and unemployment in Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 659-673.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:195:y:2022:i:c:p:272-287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.