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Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions

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  • Wu, Binzhen
  • Zhong, Xiaohan

Abstract

We examine matching inequality in students' matching outcomes for the Boston Mechanism in a large matching system, by measuring the degree of mismatch for each student. We link a student's mismatch with her reporting behavior of the first choice on her preference list to explore the reasons for matching inequality. Using administrative data from college admissions in China, we find significant gender differences, rural-urban gaps, and ethnic gaps in mismatching and first-choice behavior. These demographic differences exhibit various patterns and may be explained by risk aversion, information disadvantage, and minority-preferential admissions policies, respectively.

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  • Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan, 2020. "Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 1-21.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:1-21
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhong, Xiaohan & Zhu, Lin, 2021. "The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: Evidence from Chinese college admissions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 271-285.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Chinese college admissions; Boston mechanism; Matching inequality; Strategic behavior; Mismatch;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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