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Costly price discrimination

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  • Leeson, Peter T.
  • Sobel, Russell S.

Abstract

Standard theory neglects that enacting price discrimination is costly to firms. When this costliness is accounted for, perfect price discrimination is often socially inefficient. For pure monopolists it is sometimes socially inefficient. For monopolistic competitors it is always socially inefficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Leeson, Peter T. & Sobel, Russell S., 2008. "Costly price discrimination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 206-208, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:1:p:206-208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. V. Bhaskar & Ted To, 2004. "Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 762-776, Winter.
    2. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
    3. Varian, Hal R., 1989. "Price discrimination," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 597-654, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki, 2011. "Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Ippolito Meets Schmalensee and Varian," IKERLANAK 2011-54, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    2. Henkel, Joachim, 2022. "Licensing standard-essential patents in the IoT – A value chain perspective on the markets for technology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(10).
    3. Candela, Rosolino A. & Geloso, Vincent, 2019. "Why consider the lighthouse a public good?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Inaki Aguirre, 2012. "Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Ippolito Meets Schmalensee and Varian," Chapters, in: Rosario Laratta (ed.), Social Welfare, IntechOpen.
    5. Philip Rodgers, 2011. "Overproduction of Yearling Thoroughbred Horses," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 16(1), pages 53-64, March.
    6. Wang, Judith Y.T. & Lindsey, Robin & Yang, Hai, 2011. "Nonlinear pricing on private roads with congestion and toll collection costs," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 9-40, January.
    7. Bejan, Camelia, 2021. "On the inefficiency of perfect price discrimination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    8. Gregory M Randolph, 2012. "Price Discrimination with Producer & Consumer Transaction Costs," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 370-375.

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