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On Avoidance Activities After Accidents

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  • Friehe Tim

    (University of Konstanz)

Abstract

This paper allows for avoidance activities in the accident setting and analyzes how this affects the evaluation of uncertain due care standards and of different negligence conceptions from an efficiency perspective. Importantly, our analysis also shows that punitive damages, i.e., damages above the harm incurred, can be welfare-reducing if injurers can choose avoidance.

Suggested Citation

  • Friehe Tim, 2010. "On Avoidance Activities After Accidents," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 181-195, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:6:y:2010:i:2:n:3
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1406
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Shmuel Leshem & Geoffrey P. Miller, 2009. "All-or-Nothing versus Proportionate Damages," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 345-382, June.
    3. Tabbach Avraham D., 2008. "Causation and Incentives to Choose Levels of Care and Activity Under the Negligence Rule," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 133-152, May.
    4. Shavell, Steven, 2007. "Liability for Accidents," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 139-182, Elsevier.
    5. Stremitzer, Alexander & Tabbach, Avraham, 2009. "Insolvency and Biased Standards - The Case for Proportional Liability," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 289, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Innes, Robert, 2001. "Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 239-256, April.
    7. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-279, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2015. "Optimal Damages Multipliers in Oligopolistic Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 622-640, December.

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