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Middlemen: the good, the bad, and the ugly

Author

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  • Gary Biglaiser
  • Fei Li

Abstract

We examine the role of a middleman as an expert in markets. A seller's effort determines the quality of the good. Buyers observe neither the seller's effort nor the good's quality. A middleman, after observing a signal about the good's quality, decides whether to purchase it and then to sell it. We show that the presence of a middleman may either reduce or exacerbate the seller's moral hazard problem. We also consider a model with multiple middlemen. We find that the seller's effort is minimized if either the middleman's signal is perfect or the number of middlemen is large.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Biglaiser & Fei Li, 2018. "Middlemen: the good, the bad, and the ugly," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 3-22, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:49:y:2018:i:1:p:3-22
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12216
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary Biglaiser & Fei Li & Charles Murry & Yiyi Zhou, 2020. "Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 905-933, September.
    2. Andrew Rhodes & Makoto Watanabe & Jidong Zhou, 2021. "Multiproduct Intermediaries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(2), pages 421-464.
    3. Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras, 2020. "Entry-deterring agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 172-188.
    4. Fei Li & Charles Murry & Can Tian & Yiyi Zhou, 2024. "Inventory Management In Decentralized Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(1), pages 431-470, February.
    5. Dong Yan & Christian A. Vossler & Scott M. Gilpatric, 2020. "Product quality and third-party certification in potential lemons markets," Working Papers 2020-04, University of Tennessee, Department of Economics.
    6. Xia Li & Timothy Simcoe, 2021. "Competing or complementary labels? Estimating spillovers in Chinese green building certification," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(13), pages 2451-2476, December.

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